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Abstract 
 
 
The paper analyses the organization of the new product development process at FIAT from a 
resource-based perspective. The focus is on organizational resources for integrating dispersed 
specialist knowledge required in the development of complex products. The analysis shows 
how the application of a resource-based perspective is able to uncover negative long-term 
effects of outsourcing on the knowledge base (hollowing out), despite beneficial short-term 
effects on cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firm resources have increasingly been recognized as important for developing corporate 
strategy. The resource-based perspective of strategy complements the Industrial Organization-
perspective of strategy (Porter, 1980) and has become the dominant school in the marketing 
content literature. Building on the fundament provided by Penrose (1959) on the role of firm 
resources in the growth of the firm, the resource-based perspective has specified different 
kinds of resources, centring increasingly on intangible resources such as knowledge (Grant, 
1996) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). In particular, core 
competences have come in the focus of strategy makers (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Resource-based thinking is used for identifying the drivers of sustained competitive advantage 
(‘SCA’) (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) and for analysing corporate diversification, i.e. 
outsourcing decisions.  
 
The world automotive industry is amongst the industries that have experienced a wave of 
strong engineering outsourcing in recent years (Fujimoto, 1997; Liker et al., 1995; Helper and 
Sako, 1995; Womack et al., 1990). Besides lead time shortening, product integrity and 
flexibility, the main motivation for outsourcing is cost efficiency (Clark, 1989; Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994). Outsourcing decisions, however, also decide on the 
possession of and access to resources. In what follows we highlight knowledge and 
competencies, those being the resources that contribute most to sustained competitive 
advantage because they are the most difficult to imitate.  The present paper focuses on 
knowledge integration in the new product development process. The notion of knowledge 
applied here is the following: knowledge is a belief, the formation of which is influenced but 
not necessarily wholly determined by the processed information. Knowledge is distinct from 
information, which is data relating to states of the world and the state-contingent 
consequences that follow from events in the world (Fransmann, 1998, p. 189). In the context 
of new product development, knowledge is not important as such (for instance, as the belief 
that cross-functional teams are the best way to organize new product development), but when 
applied (being capable to organize such teams and make them work). To be able to apply 
some knowledge means to have a competence, or capability. While the latter two terms are 
used in different ways by different authors, we take them as synonyms here. The important 
point is that competence or capability is organizational. The building blocks of organizational 
competences or capabilities are individual skills (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000). Both 
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organizational competences or capabilities and individual skills refer to the ability to apply 
some knowledge. Throughout the article, we stick to the term 'knowledge integration' because 
it is used widely in the literature (e.g. Grant, 1996). It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that what ultimately matters is competence or capability. We ask the reader to remind him- or 
herself of that whenever encountering the term 'knowledge' in the text.  
Outsourcing decisions have effects not only on cost, but also on the knowledge-base. They 
decide on the location of knowledge and competencies along the supply chain (in-house or 
outsourced) and on the allocation of learning opportunities. The contribution of the resource-
based perspective is to bring the knowledge dimension into the picture. In the medium and 
long run, outsourcing can lead to a 'hollowing out' of the knowledge base, which can offset 
short-term cost advantages. Moreover, outsourcing also leads to a dispersion of specialist 
knowledge and competencies among the carmakers and its suppliers. Subsequently, 
outsourcing requires carmakers to integrate and co-ordinate more fragmented knowledge. 
  
The present paper focuses in particular on how FIAT Auto has achieved such integration  of 
knowledge and competencies. The paper reports on a longitudinal case study of FIAT Auto's 
(henceforth FIAT) new product development process (henceforth 'NPD') organisation. FIAT 
is an interesting case for studying the integration  of specialist knowledge and competencies 
for NPD because it has undergone a still uninterrupted stream of reorganisations in the last 10 
years. The FIAT case therefore allows comparison of different resource configurations for 
integrating and coordinating knowledge. FIAT Auto also represents an extreme case with 
regard to design outsourcing. In fact, as shown in more detail elsewhere (Zirpoli and Caputo, 
2002), the strong level (in terms of value of the overall product design costs) of design 
outsourcing to few first tier suppliers achieved by Fiat Auto during the nineties, was 
associated with the absence of some contextual features characterising the North American 
and Japanese context necessary to maintain a control over the “knowledge” outsourced (Fine 
and Withney, 1996, Dyer and Chu, 2000). In particular, Fiat did not hold significant equity 
stakes in its more competent first tier suppliers and, at the same time, its relationship with 
them was not rooted in long term consolidated business practices that are usually considered 
necessary to develop not equity co-operative long term business practices.   
Because in extreme cases the process of interest is more transparently observable than in other 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989) we can expect the FIAT case to be helpful in casting light also on the 
relation between a systems-integrator strategy and its implementation. 
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The major contribution of this paper is the provision of an in-depth analysis of the 
relationship that exists between (1) design outsourcing strategy, in particular the currently 
dominant strategy based on systems- and module-integration, and (2) the question of which 
organizational structures to choose for implementing such a strategy and for managing the 
new product development process. 
 
Hence, in order to maintain focus  we deliberately confine ourselves to knowledge integration 
in the NPD process, convinced that the NPD process is a good telling instance of the general 
problem of knowledge integration in companies, because the problem arises in such a 
pronounced form. Section two develops a framework for analysing knowledge integration . 
Section three describes FIAT's organisation of the NPD process. Section four then highlights 
some of the features of FIAT's NPD organisation from the perspective of how well it is suited 
for providing knowledge integration, the main challenge to the organisation and the 
management of NPD. Section five concludes and draws implications for the case of FIAT, as 
well as implications of the application of the theoretical framework to the case.  
 
 
2. A framework for analysing knowledge integration  
   
In new product development, particularly of complex products such as cars, a high number of 
very different knowledge inputs are required. For instance, in developing a new model of a 
car, chassis, engine, interior, and many components are involved, as is market intelligence 
about customers, knowledge about new materials, and knowledge about new production 
technology, to give only a few examples. A high degree of specialisation is required in all 
cases. From a management perspective, the central challenge in the organisation of the NPD 
process is therefore how to integrate and co-ordinate the specialist knowledge and 
competences of the participants in the NPD process. It is not easy for product development 
managers to meet this challenge. In particular, despite the fact that a modularity strategy 
seems to be an attractive solution, the theory does not offer much guidance to managers on the 
profound effect of an outsourcing strategy based on modularity and systems integration 
produces on knowledge integration in NPD. While much scholarly literature concerned with 
knowledge integration issues overlaps with that on product innovation, despite such overlap, 
there is a gap between the two bodies of literature. Theories anchored in economics (such as 
Hayek, 1945 and Arrow, 1962) or in knowledge management (such as Grant, 1996) are 
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somewhat too abstract. The literature on product development is too specific and theoretically 
eclectic to generate more comprehensive models (Hedlund, 1994: 74). This paper attempts to 
close this gap. It presents a framework that identifies the mechanisms which create problems 
with knowledge integration, and that allows to assess how efficient strategies adopted by 
firms are in achieving such integration.  
 
Our main concern in the present paper is to analyse the “macro” organisational mechanisms 
designed to address the problem of knowledge integration in new product development. From 
this perspective, (1) we first define what knowledge integration is and how it relates to 
knowledge creation, (2) show the variables that influence the integration of knowledge in new 
product development, (3) describe the dominant strategies to cope with integration issues and, 
finally, (4) present how these strategies find a place in the literature on new product 
development. 
 
 
Knowledge integration 
Our starting point is the observation that the automotive industry recently has experienced a 
high degree of engineering outsourcing (Fujimoto, 1997; Liker et al., 1995; Helper and Sako, 
1995; Womack et al., 1990). Such outsourcing necessarily has the implication that specialist 
knowledge, such as about designing dashboards, car seats, or wiring systems, is more 
dispersed across the supply chain than before. The degree of dispersion of knowledge 
involved has increased. This poses challenges for the new product development task 
(Moorman and Miner, 1997; Galunic and Rodan, 1998) The present section identifies the 
drivers behind problems arising from dispersed knowledge. The subsequent section identifies 
generic strategies available for encountering these problems. Three effects that can be 
discerned in the literature concerned with dispersed knowledge seem to have particularly 
grave implications on actors: large numbers, knowledge asymmetries, and uncertainty 
(Becker, 2001).  
 
Large numbers. By sheer logic, the first implication of a higher degree of fragmentation, or 
dispersion, is that there are more 'elements' than there were before. Where before, one unit of 
the engineering division held all the knowledge for designing a component, a supplier and the 
engineering division are now involved, both holding some part of the required knowledge 
(overlapping to some extent, but not completely). Dispersion thus leads to a problem of 'large 
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numbers'. Large numbers have two effects on actors. The first is an increase in resource 
requirements. The more fragments there are which have to be drawn together, the more often 
the process of drawing together those fragments will have to be repeated. Thus, time and other 
resource requirements (e.g. attention) will increase. To actors with bounded cognitive 
resources (Simon, 1955) this in turn means a lower limit regarding the number of 'issues' that 
can be dealt with at the same time. The second effect of large numbers is opaqueness. If there 
are 'too many' elements, actors simply lose overview (Egidi, 1996). This presents a problem in 
decision-making (“How many alternatives are there?”), and at the same time a problem of 
attaining understanding (e.g. of the working principle of a complex component).   
 
Asymmetries. The second implication of dispersion of knowledge is the asymmetries of the 
knowledge held by different organizational actors (cf. Fransmann, 1998). If there would be no 
asymmetries, the knowledge held by each 'part' (each actor, organization unit, etc., depending 
on the level of analysis), would be identical. But then there would be little sense in 
outsourcing, as there are no gains from specialisation. If there are such gains, the knowledge 
base of the different 'parts' is asymmetric. While for a long time it was assumed that 
specialisation, which can be seen as dispersed organizational memory, was an efficient way to 
capture and use knowledge, popular wisdom has today reversed that assumption. Often, 
shared knowledge and redundancy are credited with new product success (Moorman and 
Miner, 1997). One argument for such a reversal is that knowledge asymmetries cause 
problems because the division of labour influences the possibilities for the creation of new 
capabilities by way of learning by doing (Loasby, 1999). What is learned and what 
capabilities are acquired, however, depends on and is limited by what one can do in the first 
place (specialist knowledge being required for that). Due to learning by doing, and 
asymmetric development opportunities, the original knowledge asymmetries will deepen 
further. Such asymmetries are not just limited to knowledge and capabilities. They also 'spill 
over' to interpretive frames, as actors learn how to apply certain knowledge within their 
community of practice (Brown and Duguid, 1998). The effect is that knowledge integration 
becomes increasingly more difficult over time. 
 
Uncertainty. Minkler (1993) and Tsoukas (1996) identified uncertainty as a third effect of the 
dispersion of knowledge that causes problems. Dispersed knowledge causes structural 
uncertainty, a strong form of uncertainty that exists if a decision-maker cannot ex ante specify 
all relevant alternatives or outcomes (Minkler, 1993): 
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A firm's knowledge is distributed, not only in a computational sense ... or in Hayek's 
(1945: 521) sense that the factual knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place cannot be surveyed as a whole. But, more radically, a firm's knowledge is 
distributed in the sense that it is inherently indeterminate: nobody knows in advance 
what that knowledge is or need be. Firms are faced with radical uncertainty: they do 
not, they cannot, know what they need to know (Tsoukas, 1996: 22). 
 
Structural uncertainty (Minkler, 1993) leads to a particularly severe form of decision problem. 
The literature on decision-making helps understand the problem. Structural uncertainty is a 
form of 'second-order uncertainty' (Kahn and Sarin, 1988, p. 266), leading to ambiguous 
situations, not stochastic ones (cf. Mosakowski, 1997; Hu, 1994). The difference is that where 
in a stochastic situation the probabilities of uncertain events are known, only a probability 
distribution for the perceived frequencies is known under ambiguity (Kahn and Sarin, 1988). 
Ambiguity thus results from the uncertainty associated with specifying which of a set of 
distributions is appropriate in a given situation (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986). Decisions under 
ambiguity are decisions where there is uncertainty about the probabilities under which 
outcomes can occur (Curley, Yates and Abrams, 1986).  
 
Under structural uncertainty, neither the probabilities of the different alternative choices nor 
all the different alternatives are therefore known. And they cannot be known a priori. They 
are indeterminate and emerging. The basis for taking decisions is not clear. The dispersion of 
knowledge thus aggravates decision problems. 
 
The starting point of the paper was the observation that outsourcing, although beneficial in 
terms of cost and lead times, can also create problems, such as for instance a 'hollowing out' 
of a firm’s knowledge base. In order to address this trade-off systematically, however, 
managers need to understand what are the mechanisms by which outsourcing creates 
problems. Once such mechanisms are identified, their effects can be assessed, and counter-
measures can be taken. The above section has identified mechanisms by which the dispersion 
of knowledge (due to outsourcing) leads to management problems. The next section identifies 
strategies for responding to these management problems.  
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Solutions for integrating and co-ordinating knowledge 
 
Organisation structures as integration mechanisms. In the literature known as the 
'knowledge-based approach' to the theory of the firm1, firms are seen as providing the 
integration of specialist knowledge (Grant 1996). Firms hire specialists, put them under the 
authority of a manager, and thereby integrate the knowledge the specialists hold. This 
literature sees firms doing so by creating the conditions for knowledge integration, for 
instance providing incentives designed to foster co-ordination between individual specialists. 
Providing knowledge integration is taken to be the reason why firms exist. To provide the 
conditions for knowledge integration does not mean to provide knowledge integration, 
however. We have to ask: What are the mechanisms underlying the integration of knowledge 
in firms? Grant (1996) specifies rules and directives, sequencing, routines, and group problem 
solving and decision making as mechanisms for integrating specialised knowledge. 
 
Now, there is one problem with the notion that firms integrate specialist knowledge. A firm is 
a hierarchy, a co-ordination mechanism based on authority. The question whether an 
employee will perform a certain task is decided not by demand and supply (with prices 
conveying all necessary information), but by superiors who have authority over their 
subordinates to tell them what task to perform. The problem is that a hierarchy and its 
underlying mechanism, authority, is not a good way to integrate specialist knowledge inputs – 
even though it might be a good way to co-ordinate and integrate labour inputs. In the case of 
knowledge, it is not possible to know about the knowledge that has to be integrated and co-
ordinated for its utilisation with having that very knowledge. But in that case there will be no 
specialisation advantages realized through the coordination of specialists, due to the 
duplication of the specialist knowledge in question. Under the assumption of limited cognitive 
capacity (Simon, 1955), the possibility of integrating knowledge in this way will therefore be 
subject to limits – it is not possible at the same time to have the expert knowledge of an 
engineer, accountant, strategist, marketer, salesman etc. The knowledge of an organisational 
unit is therefore neither integrated in the unit manager’s head nor through the unit manager’s 
directives. Famously, this point has been established by Friedrich A. von Hayek who stated 
that “dispersed knowledge is essentially dispersed, and cannot possibly be gathered together 
and conveyed to an authority charged with the task of deliberately creating order” (Hayek, 
                                                          
1
 See for instance Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Spender, 1996; Foss and Foss 
, 2000 provide a good overview. 
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1988, p. 77).  
 
Substitute knowledge by access to knowledge. A second way to provide the integration of 
dispersed specialist knowledge is to create communication structures through which 
knowledge can be acquired (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Know-what or know-how is substituted by 'know-whom'. Maybe the most common 
manifestation of this strategy is 'company yellow pages' or databases that allow searching for 
who has what specialist knowledge in the organisation. One key to achieving co-ordinated 
action in the face of dispersed knowledge is to develop ways of interrelating and connecting 
the knowledge each individual has (Tsoukas, 1996). A communication channel itself, 
however, only provides the necessary, not the sufficient, requirement for integrating 
knowledge. In addition to the availability of a channel, willingness and motivation, as well as 
the competencies to use it, are also required. The notion of 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) is particularly important here, i.e. being able to receive, interpret and apply 
knowledge. 
 
The competency to fill in knowledge gaps. Knowledge gaps created by the dispersion of 
knowledge can also be dealt with by having the competence to fill them in, rather than by 
transferring the 'missing' knowledge. Egidi suggests that “in reality, individuals (...) have 
‘incomplete’ knowledge, and they are able to complete it by recreating its missing 
components” (Egidi, 1996, p. 307). Collins and Kusch (1998) argue that this strategy – at 
least to a certain extent – is applied by almost everyone in everyday life. Think about your 
own capacity to 'repair' misspellings by still recognizing the meaning. In a similar way, one 
can assume that software users typically have certain competences (for instance, 
understanding the meaning of a word even despite a missing letter) – an example of the 
competence to fill in knowledge gaps. The higher this competence, the less is possessing the 
knowledge required in order to fulfil the task.  
 
Decomposition. The problem of integrating dispersed knowledge can also be handled by 
containing the size of the problem, thus side-stepping its implications. This can be done by 
decomposing the organisational units that are to provide knowledge integration into smaller 
units. In this way, the problems caused by large numbers, and the lack of overview, are 
alleviated. Decomposition is implemented by delegating tasks. One form of delegation is 
delegation to an external unit – outsourcing. The need to integrate and co-ordinate the 
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decomposed elements is often fulfilled by what Mintzberg (1979) has called ‘co-ordination by 
standardisation of work outputs’: Outputs are standardised when the results of the work, for 
example the dimensions of the product or the performance, are specified. The notion of 
modularity is a contemporary expression of co-ordination by output standardisation. 
Modularity has been defined as an approach for organising complex products and processes 
efficiently by decomposing complex tasks into simpler portions so they can be managed 
independently (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). It consists in a scheme by which interfaces shared 
among components in a given product architecture are standardised and specified, thereby 
allowing for greater reusability and commonality sharing of components among product 
families (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996).  
 
Is this also a viable response to deal with the integration  of knowledge? In a decomposition 
or modularization approach the outcome of processes is integrated in which the knowledge in 
question has been applied. For example, a certain component of a brake system is integrated 
with other components to form the whole brake system. Knowledge is integrated by 
integrating the 'products' or 'outcomes' of the processes it was used in – but the underlying 
knowledge itself (for instance, the expertise and competencies of the engineers) is not 
integrated. This can easily been seen when considering who holds the knowledge underlying 
the competence to construct the components: in the case of outsourcing, the supplier holds it, 
while the car-maker integrates the products produced with this knowledge, but not the 
knowledge itself. This leads to a self-reinforcing effect: the fact that specialist knowledge is 
dispersed triggers a further specialisation and division of labour (possibly including 
outsourcing again) and thereby fuels the necessity of integrating (now even more specialised) 
knowledge. Once a far-sighted view on the problem is taken, the secondary (i.e., indirect and 
long-term) effects appear to outweigh the primary (i.e., direct and short-term) effects. In other 
words: decomposition can only be a short-term remedy and comes at the cost of increasing the 
very problem it is supposed to solve in the long term. 
 
Integration embodied in physical & virtual artefacts. Artefacts also help knowledge 
integration. They do so in three ways. First, artefacts represent the knowledge they are 
composed of. This is why reverse engineering can work. For instance, a particular table 
represents a solution to the problem of sustaining objects at a certain height against 
gravitation. As we know, this can be done by four vertical legs, by two legs with a broader 
base, by one leg ending in a very broad base and so forth. An observer with the appropriate 
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background knowledge (such as of gravitational forces) can infer that knowledgel from  
looking at the table. The example becomes less evident when one thinks of the proportions of 
the different parts of a table that are required in order to render it stable. Second, artefacts are 
a reference for a group, each individual of which may hold different knowledge. The artefact 
provides an ‘example’ of an architecture along which the individuals can ‘place’ their 
knowledge and structure their inputs into a problem-solving process (cf. Baba & Nobeoka 
1998). Third, due to the fact that they are  a reference, they improve communication and 
coordination amongst the holders of dispersed knowledge, thus making knowledge integration 
easier (D'Adderio, 2001; Baba & Nobeoka, 1998). Interestingly, not only real objects do have 
this feature – virtual objects (objects created in computer simulations) have a very similar 
capacity (D'Adderio, 2001; Baba & Nobeoka, 1998).  
 
 
Organisational tools  for knowledge integration in NPD 
 
After the presentation of strategies for responding to management problems created by 
dispersed knowledge (due to outsourcing), this section identifies how these strategies are 
implemented in new product development. As shown in Corso et al. (2001), there are at least 
two dimensions under which the literature on knowledge management in product innovation 
can be framed: literature concerned with the scope of the knowledge creation system (single 
product innovation process, product innovation portfolio, relationship with external actors) 
and literature that deals with the knowledge management process (knowledge creation and 
management, knowledge transfer for re-use, knowledge sharing). In practice, these two 
dimensions are strictly intertwined and inform the choice of the organisational tools to 
manage new product development.  
The first attempt in the direction of integrating knowledge in a new product development can 
be framed at the beginning of the 80’s with the introduction of the concept of concurrent 
engineering (CE). CE was trying to address the problem of integrating different product 
development phases at the single project level (Nonaka, 1990; Dowlatshahi, 1994). 
Overlapping ongoing activities by means of multifunctional teams has rapidly become a 
common practice in product development and an implicit means of addressing knowledge 
integration issues across different phases of the process.  
At the beginning of the nineties, the literature started to focus on how to improve the 
performance of teams suggesting solutions such as the heavyweight project manager 
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(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992) emphasising the role of the project leader in integrating 
knowledge and development efforts within teams. Moreover, it began to emerge that the 
creation of teams did not by itself solve the knowledge integration problems along two 
dimensions: space and time. Literature on the multi-project management (Cusumano and 
Nobeoka, 1992), the role of product families (Meyer and Utterback, 1993), the role of product 
architecture (Henderson and Clarks, 1990), and the importance of developing long term 
product plans (Wheelwright and Sasser, 1989) has tried to address both the spatial and 
temporal problem moving the focus of knowledge integration from the individual project 
level to the company level. As a consequence, from an organisational point of view, new 
managerial roles diffused such as the product manager, platform and program managers. 
In the nineties, moreover, there was also a strong emphasis on the role of external sources of 
innovation such as suppliers and customers in product development (von Hippel, 1988; Clark, 
1989; Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994). Hence, the integration problem 
began to move from the intra to the inter-company dimension. The most common solution to 
address the integration problems here, was the use of guest engineering (Nishiguchi, 1994) 
and teams that involved also suppliers. Some literature, in this respect, suggests the 
importance of gatekeepers (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990) to interact with the external sources 
of knowledge. 
A further step of the literature is linked to the re-interpretation of concepts such as component 
modularity (Whitney, 1988; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1995; Sanchez, 1994). The design strategies 
that hinge on modularity have been demonstrated to have an impact beyond the engineering 
aspects. The co-ordination of different actors (R&D centres, OEMs, suppliers, engineering 
firms) does not hinge only on the hierarchical power but is based on the design interfaces 
themselves that should act as a co-ordination
 
mechanism.  
Finally, recent literature has underlined the crisis of both traditional project-oriented and 
function-oriented organisations in facing the new innovation and multi-project managerial 
challenges and has proposed new organisational tools (Hatchuel and Weil, 1999). The new 
model shows that three different typologies of organisational units are needed in order to 
develop products in highly innovative contexts: concept-oriented units, knowledge-oriented 
units, management-oriented units. 
This distinction can give useful indications on the organisational modes to achieve an 
advantageous separation of research, development and product strategy. Once the 
component’s or system’s concept is defined by the first type of unit (concept oriented unit), 
the knowledge oriented units can develop the so-called half way solutions. The latter, in 
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contrast to what happens with the traditional research centres, are tested and validated so that 
the project leaders can introduce them with few risks. These knowledge oriented units are not 
project-based. People and functions are grouped on a technological basis or according to the 
type of system/component under development. Similarly, the units that manage the 
applications (management oriented unit) are not responsible for the overall product innovation 
contents but have the task to define the spectrum of action of the units in charge of developing 
new concepts. To sum up, organisational units endowed with a strong technological know-
how on the basis of market indications and science developments elaborate, develop, test and 
industrialise new concepts that will be exploited in specific applications by product managers. 
This solution seems to able to address the integration problem by distinguishing the type of 
knowledge required to carry out the development tasks. However, this solution pushes toward 
the centralization of R&D opposed to the outsourcing of design. Recent evidence seems to 
confirm this trend (Argyris and Silverman, 2002). 
Whether these co-ordination mechanisms are able to integrate knowledge has not been fully 
investigated yet and will be object of specific attention when results from the case study will 
be compared with the framework described above. 
In what follows, the streams of NPD literature presented above and the organisational 
solutions present in the literature are used as a backbone for the organisational analysis of the 
FIAT Auto case study. 
In Table 1, we provide a synthesis of the relationship between the strategies to cope with 
knowledge dispersion and the organisational tools suggested by the dominant literature on 
NPD organisation. The use of teams and heavyweight project managers can be associated 
with the strategies based on the usage of organisation structure. The first integration 
mechanism is hierarchical power. The new organisational roles such as that of the platform 
manager, in charge of coordinating several projects and leveraging knowledge across them, 
can be framed within the strategies of fostering knowledge sharing through organisational 
information channels. The same role is played by companies gatekeepers in inter and intra 
firm integration of knowledge. 
We did not find any formal NPD solution relating to the strategy of competency to fill in 
knowledge gaps, probably because it is not possible to formalise a competence that is strictly 
embodied in people in form of organisational tools. 
The use of standard interfaces as design and organisational coordination mechanism is clearly 
related to the decomposition strategy. Defining standard interfaces allows the decomposition 
of complex design and NPD process tasks in simpler ones. 
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Finally, the development of half way solutions in the transaction between different units of the 
company allows the integration of knowledge that is embodied both in physical and virtual 
artefacts. 
 
Table 1. Strategies to cope with knowledge dispersion, and organisational tools to implement 
these strategies 
Strategy NPD Solution 
Organisation structures (hierarchy) 
− Concurrent engineering (C.E.), Teams, 
Heavyweight project managers 
Substitute knowledge by access to 
knowledge 
− New organisational roles (i.e. platform 
managers) 
− Gate keepers 
Competency to fill in knowledge gaps 
− None 
Decomposition 
− Modularity (i.e. integration by standard 
interfaces) 
Physical and virtual artefacts 
− Half way solutions 
 
 
 
3. FIAT’s internal organisation for NPD: the macro-structure  
 
The FIAT case 
FIAT Auto was chosen because it has carried out an impressive number of organisational 
changes, both with reference to its internal structure and its supply chain. Together with an 
unprecedented outsourcing strategy it has also recently revolutionised its NPD process. In line 
with recent trends in the industry, FIAT, at the beginning of the nineties, set as its goals (1) 
platforms number reduction, (2) leadership in the distinctive style of its models, in the 
presence of a multi-brand strategy and (3) involvement of suppliers in the vehicle design up to 
85% of the overall dedicated design effort.  
 
The nature of our research made the choice of the exploratory case study method the most 
appropriate (Yin, 1994). Two data collection methods were used. The first was the study of 
archival sources to define the characteristics of the sector and the history of the selected 
company. The second involved extensive semi-structured interviews with managers from 
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FIAT Auto and one of its research centers. Data gathered refer to the last decade and were 
collected between 1998 and 2001. 
 
Period 1991-1996 
 
In 1991, the effort to rationalise the new product development process and to maximise 
common parts across models had led FIAT to create a typical matrix structure to organise 
product development. Platforms were defined on a market segmentation criterion in 
correspondence with five segments (A, B, C, D, E and Commercial Vehicles)2. Each platform 
managed the three brands, Alfa Romeo, FIAT and Lancia, and had its own general manager 
coming from the technical division, its core team, which encompassed people from all the 
functions (from purchasing to production), and relied on project leaders for each single NPD 
project. The platform was responsible for the product until its launch on the market. At this 
stage the fate of the new car was handed over to the commercial division. All platforms 
reported to the chief of the technical division who had to manage all the feedback and 
eventually co-ordinate the platforms’ efforts (Figure 1). 
 
This setting, based on the project management organisation principles, did not seem to be able 
to cope with the growing product complexity, the new role of suppliers in component design, 
and the need of product differentiation among the three FIAT Auto brands. The major pitfalls 
of this first version of FIAT platform were: 
(1) centralisation not associated with the benefit of more co-ordination, and 
(2) the scope of the activities carried out by the platform.  
 
                                                          
2
 In 1975 FIAT Auto had 10 product platforms for 13 models, with a ratio of 1.3 products per platform. In 1990 
this ratio was 3.2 with 16 models built on 5 product platforms and managed by 5 development platforms 
(Volpato, 1996, p. 163). The concept of platform in FIAT Auto has a double dimension: it corresponds both to 
the core of the vehicle and to the organisation unit in charge of managing it. Below, we refer to a platform 
exclusively from an organisational point of view and will specify when referring to a product platform. 
F u nc tion  1 F u nc tion  2 P u rch as ing
P la tform P la tform ....
T echnic a l D iv is ion ......
C .E .O
Figure 1. FIAT’s structure until 1996 
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The technical division had represented the core of FIAT Auto and of its NPD process until the 
reorganisation in 1991. In fact, the technical division was, together with the technology 
division, in charge of new components and technologies developments. This legacy resulted 
in a strong empowerment of the chief of the technical division. After the creation of the 
development platforms in 1991, he was still fully responsible for the NPD and received 
feedback from platforms on all the models under development. The increasing number of 
models, the growing complexity of co-ordination of the development tasks (also due to the 
increasing involvement of suppliers), and the pressure on costs and lead time, contributed to 
'congest' the information and knowledge flows in the NPD organisation.  
 
The second most relevant limit of the platform was the scope of its action. The hand-over of 
responsibility for the product after its launch to another unit limited the ability of the 
development platform to incorporate customers’ feedback in future product generations 
together with manufacturing insights for future design. Beyond the information processing 
limits, the motivation of the platform team also suffered from this split responsibility. 
 
Period 1995-2001 
Hence, in the mid 1990s FIAT Auto still had to gain (1) strong product integrity3, (2) cost 
savings through parts commonality among different products and (3) a renewed brand 
identity. It was forced to change its structure again.  
 
The success of the new organisation was strongly dependent on its ability to fit the needs of 
an efficient and effective multi-project strategy and at the same time, given the new FIAT’s 
mission of becoming a system integrator, to involve suppliers in the vehicle design more 
effectively and efficiently. 
The new organisational structure, defined in 1995 and operatively starting in 1996, was based 
on the existing platform concept but it radically changed the power equilibrium within the 
structure and the responsibility of the platforms.  
The new platform organisation was based on a market segmentation criterion as far as the 
seven platforms (A, B, C, D, E, commercial vehicle, internationl platform) were concerned,  
                                                          
3
 Fujimoto et al. (1996) define product integrity on the basis of two elements: the product’s coherence and the 
product’s fit. “The product’s coherence defines the extent to which the product’s details, subsystems, and 
component proactively combine to achieve consistency in concept, character, and technical functionality. […] 
The product’s fit is a measure of how well a product’s function, structure, and semantics fit the customers’ 
expectations - their objectives, values, production system, life style, or use pattern, for example.” (Fujimoto et 
al., 1996, p.126). 
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while relying on a technological basis as far as the Component Development Platform was 
concerned. Completely new were the international platform in charge of the FIAT global car 
(Palio) and the components development platform in charge of 70 different sub areas each of 
which corresponded to a specific typology of component (from ABS to wheel). The seven 
platforms in charge of car development were based on a core team formed by seven 
professional profiles (platform director, product manager, controller, plant manager, 
purchasing manager, technology engineer, technical engineer). A platform followed the life of 
the product from its generation to its end. This is the reason why, together with the scope of 
its activities, the new platform was also called extended platform. 
The development phase was managed by a project manager who was under the platform core 
team and supervised a systems manager that co-ordinated 4 system developers (chassis, body, 
engine, electric systems). Under the 4 system developers there were 19 teams, each 
correspondent to a part of the vehicle. Among these teams there were also the suppliers 
involved in the NPD. The managers who previously were in charge of the platforms under the 
technical division now reported to the newly created division for platforms development that 
deals directly with the CEO (Figure 2). 
 
The division for platforms development (henceforth DPD) has the role of co-ordinating the 
existing platforms in a coherent fashion4. It manages the NPD process from the definition of 
the process itself to its implementation. It is the point of reference for people belonging to 
different functional divisions that are employed in development teams and for the platforms. 
Finally, it is formally in charge of staffing and monitoring the work of platforms and 
development teams, taking care that a maximum level of coherence is achieved. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 It counts between 120 and 160 permanent employees, opposed to almost 3000 belonging to the technical and 
technology divisions. 
 19
 
  
Parallel to the platforms that manage specific car segments, FIAT started developing long 
range plans (usually ten years) that encompassed model substitutions and technology 
developments. These technology developments referred both to pure R&D on new materials 
(managed by the technology division and the research centres), new engine development 
(managed by the technical division and the research centres) and component development 
(managed by the components development platform).  
 
Much of FIAT's multi-project strategy was developed at this stage. Most of the operative 
work, however, was carried out by the car development platforms that customised the 
available technology to the model under development. As far as standardisation and supplier 
involvement were concerned, the components development platform (henceforth CDP) played 
a crucial role which implied three major tasks5: 
1. Concept development of major systems prior to vehicle application. 
2. Component plan to satisfy multiple scenarios. 
3. Explicit up-front application planning. 
If the CDP had not developed, or was not willing to develop a specific system in-house, 
which was the case in the majority of situations (85%), it contacted a panel of suppliers to 
define a long term plan to develop the system. The tendency was to involve suppliers before 
the concept phase began so that the moment the NPD process started, the platform core team 
could choose the appropriate component from a range of solutions. This enabled the NPD 
platform to have an early and precise idea of the technological and economic contents of the 
car that was going to be created. Usually, this early involvement was finalised to a specific 
application in a future model, and CDP and the supplier worked on the existing subsystem, 
                                                          
5
 Notably, the CDP has first reported to the DPD, and then it has been incorporated into the Technical division. 
 
F unctio n 1 F unctio n 2 P urchasing Technical D ivision
P latfo rm P latfo rm ....
D iv. for P lat. D ev. .....
C .E .O
Figure2. FIAT’s structure after 1996 
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taking it as a basis for improvement. This kind of collaboration was not very common at the 
moment of its introduction but grew considerably. As a FIAT manager put it:  
 
“We are creating a sort of relay race in which the components development platform is 
the first to start and the NPD Platform is the second. This latter platform has only to 
integrate the system which has already been developed in the new car.” (Interview, 
Global Sourcing Manager, May 1998). 
 
Once the model was introduced on the market, the product manager handed over the project 
to another member of the platform in charge of the continuous improvement of the existing 
model. This structure was characterised by the fact that the platform monitored the model 
during its whole life, integrating the development phase with the production phase. In this 
way the feedback for the following NPD was also enriched by customer suggestions and new 
production process solutions. 
 
Hence, in 1996 FIAT revolutionised its NPD process and organisation6. As can be seen, the 
traditional development team was still at the core of the development process. However, its 
tasks were narrowed in some respects. The components development platform, the technical 
division and the technology division did much of the job of components development. The 
NPD dedicated team had to focus on the vehicle concept generation and implementation. 
Components were developed in the above-mentioned long term plans. FIAT divided a car into 
105 parts (systems). Each of the 105 component/system developments was monitored by 
either the components development platform, the technical division, or the technology division 
and in most cases outsourced to third parties, such as suppliers or engineering consultancy 
firms. In this way FIAT was implementing its strategic goal of becoming a systems integrator. 
The new organisation hinged on the concept of modular product architecture. This enabled 
the leveraging of similar technologies on extended platforms for application in many different 
models7.  
 
                                                          
6
 As to the re-engineering of FIAT see also Lipparini and Melloni (1996) and Calabrese (1997). 
7
 Areas in which a modular architecture can contribute are wheelbase, track, overhangs, suspension, engines 
(Sheriff, 1998). The new flexible chassis structure named 'space frame', core of the new FIAT Multipla, is the 
typical example of this strategy. FIAT, however, is now taking into great consideration the trade-off between 
importance to the customer of variety and cost of variety. Thus, Engine and Chassis usually form a product 
platform and are leveraged in different models also across market segments. Components such as door latches 
are completely standardised, ventilation and axles are often in common, while sheet metal, steering wheels and 
front fascias are greatly differentiated among models (Sheriff, 1998). 
 21
The so-called multi-project management (Cusumano and Nobeoka, 1998) was carried out by 
the division for platform development, which monitored and co-ordinated the development 
teams headed by the product managers and, so doing, co-ordinated the development efforts of 
different projects. The management of long-term development plans, however, was delegated 
to the technical division and the technology division (the CDP is now part of the technical 
division but is considered separately, given its peculiar role in involving external sources of 
knowledge within the firm). Figure 3 shows how organisational units endowed with a strong 
technological know-how, on the basis of market indications and science developments, 
elaborated, developed, tested and industrialised new concepts that would have been exploited 
in specific applications by product managers. 
 
The component development units were not project oriented but mainly organised on a 
technological basis8. They developed solutions that, despite being tested and industrialised, 
were generic enough to be leveraged on different models. The extended platforms focused on 
the application of these solutions acting, at the same time, as market gate keepers and 
contributing to the generation of new concepts. With reference to suppliers involved in long 
term plans of component/system developments, they could, as an extension of the components 
development platform, be considered as knowledge units as well.  
In reality, there were several frictions that inhibited FIAT’s new structure benefiting from the 
potential of modular design and the components development platform as far as supplier 
involvement was concerned. Problems were mainly related to the fact that those who played 
the  role of interface between the knowledge generator (supplier) and the application manager 
needed to have a strong technological and marketing command. FIAT’s components 
development platform seemed to have these skills. On the other hand, it did not have 
sufficient independence in choosing the suppliers and managing the relationship with them. 
The power equilibrium was still in favour of the purchasing department (now FIAT-GM 
world wide purchasing) whose task it was to lower the price of supply while improving the 
quality standards of the component purchased. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 We refer here to concept, knowledge and management oriented units as described by Hatchuel and Weil 
(1999). We expand their perspective in the next section.  
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Figure 3. A synthesis of new product development organisation at Fiat Auto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 2001 up to date 
During the year 2001 the situation has changed again. In March 2000, FIAT Auto set up an 
agreement with GM based on an equity swap and, from an operative point of view, on the 
formation of two companies in which all FIAT Auto and GM (Europe and Latin America) 
activities related to purchasing, engines and transmissions’ design and production were 
merged. The setting-up of GM-FIAT World Wide Purchasing has great relevance here. This 
company has unified the purchasing activities of FIAT and GM, which have agreed not to use 
other purchasing channels than this one (FIAT does not have a purchasing division anymore). 
The new company is willing to achieve results both in the short term, thanks to improved 
efficiency in the purchasing process due to bigger volumes (in the geographical area where 
the agreement is in force, FIAT and GM sell 2.700.000 vehicles each), in the medium term 
with major components sharing between the two companies, and in the long term with the 
common development of components and platforms. 
 
Another complete reshaping of the internal organization structure has taken place in 2002. It 
would not be appropriate to report on these changes given the stage of their implementation. 
What is relevant, however, is that apparently neither the DPD nor the CDP will considerably 
change its scope of activity. On the other hand, major changes will occur in common platform 
and brand management.  
 
CEO
Technical division Technology division
Component Development
Platform
Division for Platform 
Development
PlatformA
ProductManager Model A.1
PlatformB
ProductManager Model A.2
PlatformC
Componentdevelopmentarea
Vehicledevelopmentarea
(fromvehicleconcepttoproductretirement)
Halfway solutions
Hintsfrommarkets
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Table 2. Strategies to cope with knowledge dispersion and organisational tools applied in 
FIAT Auto 
Strategy NPD Solution 
Organisation structures (hierarchy) 
− C.E., Teams, Heavyweight project 
managers 
Substitute knowledge by access to 
knowledge 
− DPD 
Competence to fill in knowledge gaps 
− None 
Decomposition 
− DPD, CDP 
Physical and virtual artefacts 
− CPD (Half way solutions) 
 
 
4. The knowledge integration  characteristics of FIAT's NPD organisation  
 
4.1 Effects of the reorganization9 
 
Effect #1: The integration problem can be expected to increase in the future 
 
In 1995 FIAT had recognised that it had a problem coping with the complexity of the new 
product development process and decided to change the organizational structure of the NPD 
process. In the reorganisation of 1996, FIAT introduced the Division for Platform 
Development (DPD) and the Component Development Platform (CDP). In contrast to the 
previous organisational structure, the DPD now reported directly to the CEO. Furthermore, 
the DPD had the task of organisational co-ordination, such as staffing of the platforms. It 
also implemented multi-project management. These measures solved the problem of the 
'bottleneck' in the organisation structure that led to difficulties in dealing with complexity. 
While the DPD was made responsible for organizing the NPD process, the CDP was put in 
charge of the development of the components themselves, i.e., of the technical level. It is 
important to note that whereas the DPD reported directly to the CEO, the CDP was part of the 
technical division.  
 
                                                          
9
 The analysis of the FIAT Auto case is based on the passage from the first to the second reorganisation (i. e. that 
of 1996) and refers to the latter. 
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What implications did the introduction of DPD and CDP have on FIAT's competence of 
integrating knowledge? In order to identify the implications, we will focus on the range of 
'tools' from the literature on the organization of the new product development process and 
then identify which effect of increased dispersion of knowledge has been addressed, and how. 
In this section, we concentrate on the three kinds of organisational units in new product 
development as distinguished by Hatchuel and Weil (1999). 
In Hatchuel and Weil's terms, the CDP (as well as the technical division of which it is a part, 
and the technology division), were a knowledge-oriented unit. The DPD, on the other hand, 
was a management-oriented unit. The CDP and the two divisions just mentioned were not 
project oriented but were mainly organised on a technological basis. They developed solutions 
that, although being tested and industrialised, were generic enough to be leveraged on 
different models. With the components development platform (CDP), FIAT was probably 
trying to put into practice the concept of modular design and the new role of suppliers in the 
product development process. Such a strategy hinged on the concept of modularity as enabler 
of generic (halfway) solutions that can be used in a relatively safe and quick way by several 
product managers. Only by creating the components development platform (CDP), supplier 
involvement could be carried out at the concept stage of development and, at the same time, 
FIAT could count on components and systems that could be introduced in more than one 
model in an inexpensive way. The reason why this was not possible in the traditional 
platform-based structure is that the involvement of suppliers at the concept stage becomes too 
idiosyncratic to the specific model under development, leading to what has been called “fat” 
design (Fujimoto, 1997). The framework introduced in section 2 allows us to trace which 
driving forces of the knowledge integration problem have been addressed by the introduction 
of DPD and CDP. The three driving forces of integration problems identified were large 
numbers, knowledge asymmetries and uncertainty. The DPD appears to be addressing the 
large number problem. This becomes clear when informants describe the problem as a 
communicative bottleneck. Of the two effects of large numbers – higher resource 
requirements for integrating the dispersed elements and loss of overview – introducing the 
DPD clearly addresses the first effect. How was the second effect tackeld, the loss of 
overview? In our interpretation, the CDP was to tackle this problem. The way in which the 
CDP addressed it was by the strategy of decomposition: rather than having the specialist 
knowledge required for the design of the various components in-house and co-ordinating it 
internally, the choice was to decompose the problem, and to delegate the integration  of the 
specialist knowledge required for designing (and subsequently, producing) parts either to the 
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technical or the technology division, or to suppliers. The task of the CDP then was to 
integrate that specialist knowledge held by others, within and outside FIAT. Now, the crucial 
point is that the CDP, responsible for integrating the specialist knowledge and competences of 
the suppliers, chose exactly the same strategy as the DPD : decomposition. The CDP thus 
attempted to integrate knowledge and components by integrating the products produced with 
the knowledge, not the knowledge itself. This difference matters because it means that efforts 
of knowledge integration were limited only to architectural knowledge, not component-
specific knowledge. Both the management-oriented units and the knowledge-oriented units 
relied on decomposition. The implication was that the knowledge-oriented unit (CDP) was 
actually not fulfilling its role of integrating knowledge and competencies with regard to 
component-specific knowledge, but was delegating the problem further, to the suppliers. 
Remember that CDP stands for ‘Component Development Platform’. In fact, the CDP was 
doing exactly the opposite of integrating component-specific knowledge. It was fuelling a 
further dispersion of component-specific knowledge. The idea that the CDP would integrate 
the specialist component-specific knowledge turned out to be largely an illusion.  
As explained in section 2, the decomposition strategy is only a short-term remedy, as it 
actually has the implication of aggravating and accelerating the problem of dispersed 
specialist knowledge. The strategy chosen by FIAT can thus be expected to aggravate the 
problem that it was designed to solve.  
 
Effect #2: Specialist knowledge is pushed further out of reach 
 
The CDP not only chose the decomposition strategy and the delegation of component 
development. It also chose to delegate around 80% of the components to be developed outside 
FIAT. This added another difficulty to the task of integrating specialist knowledge: namely, 
that knowledge was now more difficult to reach, too, as it was held outside the firm. This 
meant that taking direct influence through authority was not possible anymore. Any kind of 
influence, for instance through appropriately designed incentives, would be much more 
complicated. Furthermore, asymmetries in bodies of knowledge held by suppliers and by 
FIAT would further increase due to the fact that because of outsourcing of design to the 
supplier, the supplier would experience learning-by-doing effects, while FIAT would not 
experience those. These asymmetries in bodies of specialist knowledge would then feed 
asymmetries in cognitive framework such as conceptualizing the architecture of a car.  
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The conclusion is therefore that specialist knowledge will slip out of reach even more than 
before, and it will become increasingly difficult for FIAT to integrate it. It has become more 
difficult because, due to the pursuit of massive outsourcing, the problem now is not only how 
to integrate specialist knowledge, but also how to integrate specialist knowledge held to a 
large extent by other firms. On top of that, asymmetries between the specialist knowledge and 
the cognitive frameworks of the automaker and the suppliers will increase if no action is taken 
to alleviate this effect.  
 
 
Effect #3: Internal absorptive capacity is weakened 
 
As will be argued in this section, there is another reason why the organization structure 
chosen in the 1996 reorganization did not lead to the desired result. While we have described 
above how the new organization structure and the strategy chosen made the integration task 
more difficult, we will now show why the organizational capability of knowledge integration 
was weakened.  
 
In order to understand how organization structures like the CDP provide knowledge 
integration, we now focus on the role of teams, one of the key organizational structures in 
new product development (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Teams have also been credited with a 
role in knowledge integration. More specifically, interaction within teams seems to be where 
knowledge integration is taking place.  
 
In order to assess the capability of CDP and DPD to integrate knowledge, we therefore need 
to look at how the introduction of CDP and DPD affects the functioning of teams, in 
particular interaction flows. In section 2 we have described how the tasks of the traditional 
development team were narrowed when the DPD was introduced in 1996. The development 
teams still remained at the core of the development process, however. Importantly, the 
delegation of component development outside the team was stepped up, be it to the technical 
division, the technology division (in-house), a research centre or to suppliers (outsourcing). In 
the latter case, the CDP had an integration  task. The NPD dedicated team therefore had a 
narrower focus on the vehicle concept generation and implementation, as opposed to 
component generation and implementation. Focussing on the analysis of interaction as the key 
driver of knowledge integration, the conclusion is clear: the increasing split of vehicle concept 
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development and component development tasks – by allocating them to different 
organisational units – will lead to two different circuits of interaction, one regarding vehicle 
concept development and the other regarding component development. Over time, these 
circuits of interaction will form two distinct (if possibly overlapping) communities of 
practice, with distinct mental frameworks, a distinct language, and distinct ways of 
interacting, planning, reporting and the like. Rather than alleviating asymmetries – and 
thereby working towards knowledge integration – these are aggravated. This interaction-
driven effect will furthermore be reinforced and amplified by the fact that the DPD reports 
directly to the CEO, i.e. is a relatively independent unit, while the CDP is part of the technical 
division. It is easy to imagine how the perspective of the CEO will differ from that of the head 
of the technology division, and thus, that DPD and CDP are exposed to very different 
influences. It therefore appears highly likely that there will be an effect of decreasing 
knowledge integration capability, as the development of a gap between these two areas is 
programmed. Such a gap will clearly make knowledge integration more difficult. 
 
Another driver that decreases FIAT's knowledge integration capability is that internal 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is also negatively affected by the 
reorganization. Absorptive capacity can be generated in several ways: as a by-product of a 
firm’s R&D investment, as a by-product of manufacturing (learning by doing), and as a 
product of direct investment (for instance in training). Now, to the extent that manufacturing 
and design are (at least partly) outsourced, there are less sources of absorptive capacity. This 
has wide-ranging consequences, not in the immediate short term, but in the medium- and 
long-term. Once absorptive capacity in a certain field has not been generated and/or renewed 
so that a certain minimum level is kept up, the firm may never assimilate and exploit new 
information in that field. It will be ‘locked out’ from further development (cf. Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
 
Absorptive capacity is thus also required internally, between different organisational units. It 
can be provided by boundary spanners or 'linking pins', institutionalised personal contacts 
across organisational units. The more dissimilar the knowledge to be transferred or integrated, 
the more important boundary spanners are. As vehicle concept and component design are 
becoming increasingly detached, the importance of boundary spanners that can 'translate' the 
cognitive models, transfer knowledge between the units, and integrate knowledge into the unit 
under consideration, will be ever more important.  
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The organization structure put in place by FIAT in the 1996 reorganization therefore seems to 
make the task of integration of specialist knowledge more difficult and to weaken the 
organisational capability to integrate specialist knowledge10.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of the paper has been to fill the gap between (1) design outsourcing strategy, in 
particular the currently dominant strategy based on systems- and module-integration, and (2) 
the question of which organizational structures to choose for implementing such a strategy 
and for managing the new product development process. We have cast light on the relation 
between a systems-integrator strategy and its implementation from the case of FIAT Auto, 
which seems particularly adequate as FIAT has pursued a design outsourcing strategy to a 
higher degree than any other firm in the auto industry.  
 
The framework for managing dispersed knowledge introduced in the paper allows us to 
analyse the way in which such a strategy has been implemented. It is clear that FIAT has 
relied on a 'pure' strategy of decomposition. Such a strategy was implemented by introducing 
two new organizational units, the DPD and the CDP. Our analysis has shown that the fact that 
not only the DPD, but also the CDP have chosen to respond to the dispersion of knowledge by 
further decomposition, actually led to disperse specialist knowledge even further, rather than 
to integrate it, at least with regard to component-specific knowledge. The conclusion therefore 
is that such a strategy will further aggravate, rather than alleviate, the problem. In addition, 
the measures adopted in the reorganization also led to a weakening of the organizational 
capability for knowledge integration. FIAT, as the most prominent Italian automaker, 
therefore appears to be in danger of hollowing out its knowledge-base. 
 
There is more to be learned from the FIAT Auto case. Revisiting the three effects of the 
measures taken by FIAT Auto as identified above, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Effect #1 has shown that there is a difference in kind between the decomposition strategy and 
the other strategies. The difference consists in the fact that the decomposition strategy, while 
alleviating the problems created by the dispersion of specialist knowledge in the short term, 
aggravates them in the long term. For this reason, it is crucial that counter-balancing measures 
                                                          
10
 Counter actions such as job rotation fostered by career incentives do not seem to be used extensively at FIAT, 
not as reported by Takeishi (2002). 
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are taken in order to provide a counter-weight to such detrimental effects when pursuing the 
decomposition strategy. Effect #2 has pointed out that when applying outsourcing, managers 
lose one strategic option out of the range of possible responses: knowledge integration by 
direction, based on authority within the hierarchy of the firm. While it is not excluded that 
there are other forms of authority that allow a similar kind of knowledge integration (for 
instance authority within a network), such forms are not as strong as authority conferred by 
hierarchy (Williamson, 1985). As it turns out, this option is a very powerful one. Losing it 
thus significantly diminishes the range of possible managerial responses. Finally, effect #3 
means that implementing an outsourcing strategy also has the implication that the efficiency 
of the 'access to knowledge' response will be dampened. The 'further' away from the firm, the 
more difficult to access. Taken together, the implications of an outsourcing strategy are that 
the options available to new product development managers for addressing the central 
problem in managing the new product development process are drastically reduced, both in 
number and efficiency. 
 
Implications for practice 
 
The main implication for practice resulting from our analysis of the case of FIAT Auto is that 
a design outsourcing strategy is difficult to implement. Two difficulties in particular can be 
pinpointed. First, the danger of hollowing out the knowledge-base. This can lead to problems 
with evaluating components (Lincoln, Ahmadjian and Mason, 1998) and general loss of 
design and new product development capabilities, due for instance to loss of the capability to 
handle the product architecture well (take vibration control as an example). Addressing that 
danger is the main challenge in implementing a design outsourcing strategy. This is where the 
second difficulty comes to bear, however. The main task in managing new product 
development being to integrate knowledge dispersed within the firm and across the supply 
chain, the possible options for implementing knowledge integration are much diminished 
when this task is tackled by decomposition (internally in the firm by introducing new, more 
specialized, orgnizational units, or externally by outsourcing to suppliers). In such a case, it is 
crucial to be aware that counter-balancing measures have to be taken in order to provide 
counter-measures for such effects that aggravate the knowledge integration problem. 
Boundary spanners that can put in place well-functioning communication between the new 
(internal or external) specialised units are one possibility. Keeping internal organizational 
units involved in the same activity as the external suppliers, by way of dry runs, shadow 
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engineering, or patenting in the supplier's domain, is another one. A clear result of the 
analysis of the FIAT Auto case is that whenever outsourcing is applied, such counter-
balancing measures are urgently required. Without them, the risk of a hollowing out the 
knowledge-base, and the consequence of loss of parts evaluation capability (Lincoln, 
Ahmadjian and Mason 1998) will become a reality. With such countermeasures, firms may 
have a chance of combining the best of both worlds: the speed and cost efficiency of 
outsourcing, and the maintenance of their knowledge base (while updating it through 
learning). 
 
Implications for research 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the paper has addressed the question how to implement a 
systems integrator strategy. Such a strategy can be applied particularly well for modular 
products, for which reason auto manufacturers are eager to work towards the modularization 
of cars. Modularity is currently the dominant strategy in the automotive industry.  
 
Now, applying a resource-based perspective on new product development organization has  
shown that there is an important gap between a systems-integrator strategy and how to 
implement it. One cannot address the implementation of such a strategy by merely focussing 
on the physical dimension (production, logistics etc.). Accordingly, transaction cost logic will 
most likely come to its limits here. Rather, it is important to recognise what is in the gap 
between that strategy and its implementation, what determines the effects of different ways of 
implementing a systems-integrator strategy. The resource-based view highlights that the 
central challenge in new product development is knowledge integration (Grant, 1996). 
Recently, literature indicates that systems integration is not the same as knowledge integration 
(Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2002; Nesta and Dibiaggio, 2002). The boundaries of the 
division of labour and the division of knowledge do not always, and not necessarily, overlap. 
If that is true, however, and if the resource-based analysis is right in that knowledge 
integration is the central challenge of the new product development process (and not the 
integration of modules and components into the product as a whole), then a shift of emphasis 
is needed: from a systems-integrator strategy to a knowledge-integrator strategy. After all, it is 
at this level that the success of the systems-integrator strategy will be decided.  
 
It should be clear by now that taking a resource-based perspective with a focus on knowledge 
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has something to add in order to understand the organization of new product development. In 
a transaction cost economics perspective, attention is focused on the question of how to 
govern exchange relationships in the most efficient way while safeguarding against the risks 
of exploitable dependencies. A production-cost perspective (such as taken by many managers) 
is dominated by a short time horizon, just as justifying long-term benefits is difficult due to 
problems in measuring long-term benefits. In both perspectives, the medium- and long-term 
perils associated with the hollowing out of the knowledge base are underestimated or 
neglected. Even more to the point, only the resource-based perspective uncovers strategies to 
counter-weigh the reliance on a systems-integrator strategy. The FIAT case presented here 
can thus be seen as a strong case in point for a (complementary) application of the resource-
based perspective to strategic questions in the area of operations strategy. 
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